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Essay
SHAKESPEARE IN LAW:
THE USE OF HISTORY IN SHATTERING STUDENT CREDULITY
ELLEN WERTHEIMER*
INTRODUCTIONL AW students read legal opinions. These provide various components
of legal education, including the law itself and (perhaps more impor-
tantly) the techniques of analysis that law students need to learn. There is,
however, at least one aspect of the law that is not included in this curricu-
lum. The opinions of course include facts. But these facts are set, unques-
tionable and beyond research. This Essay examines whether this signal
omission makes sense.
I. Do FACTS MATTER?
A. In General
Facts of course matter. They are the basis for any lawsuit, the cause
for its existence and the platform on which any decision rests. At the start
of most lawsuits, the various parties will have their own versions of what
occurred, and part of the resolution of the suit lies in reaching conclu-
sions about what really happened. This can be a lengthy, complex and
messy process, and there is no guarantee that the final version in the
courts sets forth the actual course of events.
Once a case has been completely decided, however, and all appellate
opinions written, the facts of that case matter only insofar as they are in-
cluded in the opinions. An appellate opinion includes facts and the appli-
cation of the law thereto. The process by which the facts were decided
vanishes from the case. The law may be developed or changed in the
course of the opinion. The opinion may be cited in the future. But no
one will ever know what really happened. Nor will anyone care. The opin-
ion does not depend upon the real course of events, but rather upon what
the court includes in its recitation of the facts. What really happened
ceases to count. We will never know what really happened to Mrs. Palsgraf
on her fateful journey into legal lore.1 Nor does the court's opinion hinge
in any way upon the actual happenings on that train platform.
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., J.D., Yale. I wish
to thank my research assistant, Jessica Christie, for her enthusiastic help in
preparing this Essay.
1. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (holding rail-
road not responsible for injuries to Mrs. Palsgraf caused by falling scales).
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This truth was brought home to me in my law school Property class.
The materials for that class included Otero v. New York City Housing Author-
ity,2 an opinion by a court I had already been taught to view as august, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. As it happened, I
grew up across the street from the site upon which the building at the
center of that case was constructed, and I watched the entire process un-
fold. The facts as recounted in the opinion bore no discernible resem-
blance to the actual history and course of events. But for my purposes as a
law student, and ultimately as a lawyer, this dissonance had no impor-
tance. The facts as included in the case became just another hypothetical.
Itjust happened that this was the hypothetical upon which the result came
to rest, and that this hypothetical had nothing to do with the actual state
of affairs.
History is the opposite. When the dust has cleared, historians pounce
on the various events, seeking to uncover the truth. The focus is on what
really happened. 3 It is possible that the truth will never be known; in the
absence of time machines, it is philosophically arguable that we can never
know the truth of what happened. But historians have a lot of fun trying
to uncover the truth and arguing that the version they espouse is the only
one with any claim to accuracy or legitimacy. They also enjoy debating the
process of weeding the facts out from amidst the often intense biases of
those who recount them.
Perhaps the classic example of this phenomenon is the debate over
whether Richard III had his nephews murdered in the Tower of London. 4
2. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
3. See BERNARD BAILYN, ON THE TEACHING AND WRITING OF HISTORY 7-13
(1994).
In contrast, in Rice v. Cayetano, 120 S. Ct. 1044 (2000), the Supreme Court of
the United States recounted a portion of the history of Hawaii, specifically noting
(somewhat ahistorically) that the Court needed to "recount events as understood
by the lawmakers [at the time]," and not as understood by "[h]istorians and other
scholars who write of Hawaii." Id. at 1048.
This opinion contrasts sharply with the painstaking effort at historical accu-
racy presented in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374-84
(1980).
4. The question of whether Richard III was responsible for the deaths of the
Princes in the Tower of London is perhaps the classic example of historians com-
bining the fun of wading through historical materials and arguing about their sig-
nificance. Josephine Tey made this historical mystery both popular and accessible
in her classic, The Daughter of Time (1951). Others have followed. See, e.g., ALISON
WEIR, THE PRNCES IN THE TOWER (1995) (concluding Richard III was evil mur-
derer). For an excellent discussion of the existing evidence (and lack thereof), see
PAUL MURRAY KENDALL, RiCHARD THE THIRD 465-95 (1983). For a thorough exami-
nation of the history of Richard's reputation, see V.B. LAMB THE BETRAYAL OF RiCH-
ARD III (1996).
What makes this debate particularly entertaining is that who (if anyone) mur-
dered the Princes can have no impact on life today, although this was not always
the case. Sir Thomas More wrote his 1513 "biography" of Richard III (if he wrote
it), from the perspective of a rising lawyer during the reign of Henry VIII, whose
father was the man who had overthrown Richard III and who himself felt notori-
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There were, of course, no known eyewitnesses.5 If one were to believe the
sources closest in time to the actual events, one would conclude that Rich-
ard III was the most evil of uncles.6 As it turns out, however, those sources
are among the most biased, having been written by persons dependent for
their livelihood on the dynasty that overthrew Richard and usurped the
throne of England. Indeed, a strong argument can be made for the prop-
osition that Richard III's worst mistake was to lose the Battle of Bosworth,
because he lost control both of England and of those who would write the
history of the period. 7
In law, then, facts cease to matter once they have been engraved in
the stone of an appellate opinion. To the historian, facts always matter.
In neither profession can we ever know with certainty what really hap-
pened.8 In law, this breeds indifference. In history, this breeds debate.
ously insecure about this usurpation as the source of his throne. Shakespeare's
patrons, Elizabeth I and James VI and I, were both descended from Henry VII,
who, as mentioned above, was the person responsible for Richard III losing both
his throne and his life. Concluding that Richard III had not murdered the Princes
in the Tower would have left both More and Shakespeare out on a politically dan-
gerous twig-like limb. This does not, of course, prove either that Richard did or
did not have his nephews murdered. Nor do the risks of a contrary conclusion
prove that More and Shakespeare were lying. They may well have recounted what
they believed to be the truth, and the fact that they may have been biased in itself
proves nothing about the accuracy (or lack of accuracy) of their conclusions.
Obviously, we will never know for certain either (1) whether the Princes were
murdered or (2) who murdered them (if they were murdered). This has never
stopped anyone from debating the issue. See AUDREY WILLIAMSON, THE MYSTERY OF
THE PRINCES (1992).
5. The earliest source is Sir Thomas More, who wrote (maybe) a biography of
Richard III in 1513, some 28 years after Richard's death. In what is perhaps an
excess of credulity, the eminent John Julius Norwich points out that the "trouble
about this second legend [i.e., of a non-guilty Richard] is that it flies in the face of
our best witness, Sir Thomas More." JOHN JULIUS NORWICH, SHAKESPEARE'S KINGS
356 (1999). Sir Thomas More was seven years old in.1485, when the Battle of
Bosworth Field put Henry VII on the throne. Calling him a witness to the stirring
events of 1483-85 seems something of an overstatement. "Thomas More gathered
most of his information by word-of-mouth." PAUL MURRAY KENDALL, RICHARD III:
THE GREAT DEBATE 24 (1965). Kendall also attributes some of More's information
to what More heard some six years after Bosworth as a page in John Morton's
household. John Morton, who was Henry VII's Archbishop of Canterbury, had
worked hard for Richard's demise. It is of course the case that any information
More obtained would have been generated during the era of Richard's successors,
and word of mouth has never been a particularly reliable source of data. Indeed,
its unreliability spawned the world of hearsay.
6. Certainly Shakespeare thought so. See generally, KENDALL, supra note 4.
7. Another king who lost a critical battle, and ended.up traduced by Shake-
speare and historians generally, was Macbeth. It comes as a surprise to those famil-
iar with Shakespeare's play that Macbeth ruled Scotland well and fairly for some 16
years, and was known as "Good King Macbeth." When Malcolm defeated Macbeth,
he defeated both Macbeth and Celtic Christianity. Thus, when Malcolm took over
the country, persons loyal to him and to the church he established took over the
task of creating the history that in turn led to Shakespeare's play. See generally
PETER ELLIS, MACBETH (1980).
8. This is particularly true, of course, the further back in time one proceeds.
3
Wertheimer: Shakespeare in Law: The Use of History in Shattering Student Cred
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Another difference between law and history lies in the nature of the
facts at issue. Mrs. Palsgraf was herself a supremely unimportant person,
and the explosives toppled a scale, not a throne. History is not interested
in people like that, or at least it was not until the study of Everyperson
came into vogue. In this connection, it is perhaps worth noting that Ever-
yperson is a hypothetical individual, invented to represent a generation of
nonentities. Mrs. Palsgraf was a real person who became a hypothetical.
Everyperson began and ended existence as a hypothetical.9
But it seems to me that the callings of law and history are different at
a more fundamental level. After all, occasionally an already important
person appears in a legal case, or a famous person is tried.10 In a way, the
facts are history, or part of it. It seems to me that the difference lies in the
9. The notable exception to this is the journal-keeper or letter-writer. This
person need not be him or herself of historical importance. The Everyperson who
happened to keep a journal opens a window on events. Arguably, however, that
person remains historically unimportant, even though the contents of the materi-
als may be crucial. See, e.g., ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF A YOUNG GIRL (B.M.
Mooyaart trans., 1967) (1947); FRANCES & JOSEPH GIES, A MEDIEVAL FAMILY: THE
PASTONS OF 15TH CENTURY ENGLAND (HarperCollins 1998).
10. See generally United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. 455 (1807). The career of Aaron
Burr serves as a case in point. Aaron Burr was the third Vice-President of the
United States, serving in Thomas Jefferson's first term. He failed to win renomina-
tion in 1804 as Vice-President. He also failed to win the governorship of New York,
largely because of opposition by Alexander Hamilton. Burr, a member of the Old
Republican Party (which later became the Democratic-Republican party) and
Hamilton, leader of the Federalist party, were publicly and privately at odds over
their political differences. Burr challenged Hamilton to a duel in Weehawken,
NewJersey, on July 11, 1804. Hamilton was killed in the duel, but Burr was never
criminally charged with his death. Warrants were issued for Burr's arrest, but no
attempt was made to bring him to trial. Burr, however, was indicted for treason in
1807 in a plot that involved the Louisiana territory and seizing Mexico from Spain.
The Burr Conspiracy, as it was called, remains largely a mystery. Burr was acquit-
ted in 1807 after a six-month trial, but his career was ruined. For a discussion of
the Burr Conspiracy, see RICHARD BROOKHISER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: AMERICAN
208, 210-13 (1999); GORE VIDAL, BURR (1989).
Another example of history and legal case joining in significance is John Ad-
ams' defense of the British soldiers charged with murder after the Boston Massacre
of 1770. The Townshend Acts had been enacted by the British Parliament in 1767.
These Acts suspended the New York Assembly for not complying with the law re-
quiring the colonies to provide adequate quartering of British troops and also im-
posed customs on colonial imports of glass, red and white lead, paints, paper and
tea. Demonstrators protesting these Acts provoked British soldiers into firing at
the crowd. Five men in the crowd were killed and the soldiers were tried for mur-
der. John Adams defended the British soldiers because he believed every person
was entitled to a fair trial. See generally Rex v. Preston, 63 (Suffolk Sup. Ct. 1770);
JOHN E. FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE (1992).
The Adams family provides yet another example. John Quincy Adams, the
sixth President of the United States, argued the fate of slaves aboard L'Amistad
before the United States Supreme Court. John Q. Adams, who had already served
as diplomat, senator, secretary of state, president and congressman, was an avid
abolitionist. He argued for the return of the slaves to Africa and won. See United
States v. Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, 518 (1841); PAUL C. NAGEL, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: A
PUBLIC LIFE, A PRIVATE LIFE 379-81, 384 (1997).
[Vol. 45: p. 463
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profound irrelevance of facts after a case is over, as opposed to their
supreme importance to the historian.
B. In Law School
For a legal system to work, the principles upon which it rests must be
impervious to factual challenge. In other words, the concept of duty set
forth in the Palsgraf opinion may be subject to analytical challenge, but is
not subject to challenge based upon what really happened to that scale.
Nor should it be. We can frame hypotheticals and examine what the rea-
soning would have been in the face of those hypotheticals. But the facts
are as set forth in the opinion and could not be changed, even if we did
discover irrefutable evidence that they were not as stated.
Does this phenomenon create problems for the law student? It does
not create problems in terms of success in law school itself, because law
school is based on materials in which the facts are not subject to debate.
Hypotheticals are, of course, a familiar tool, but they cannot change the
facts as set forth in the opinion. They begin with "assume that. .. "; the
debate is not an argument about what really happened.
This approach to facts may create risks outside the scope of success in
law school, however. One risk is that students become credulous. Stu-
dents are all too inclined to take legal opinions at their face value as it is.
They want to learn "the law," but not to question it in either its formative
or final stages. If students are taught that the facts in a legal opinion are
inevitably beyond question, with the implied imprimatur of accuracy upon
them, their already excessive deference to legal opinions becomes
enhanced.
The assumption of accuracy creates another problem that may not
surface until the student has been graduated to the real world. If facts are
consistently ignored as facts, and only studied as platforms for legal analy-
sis, the importance of facts in the phases of a case that precede appellate
opinions may well be forgotten. Our system of legal education has a
strong tendency to understate the importance of the facts in a case, simply
because they are not subject to debate as facts. The legal arguments are
all-important; the facts not important at all. To the protagonists, this of
course was not the case at the time of trial, nor was it the case for their
attorneys or for the judge and jury. The emotional content of a case may
be substantial. Moreover, all the litigants may be telling the truth-but
their versions may also be mutually exclusive. The fact that a recollection
may be inaccurate or that a recollection may change does not mean that
the recollector is lying. In addition to realizing how nebulous and evasive
the factual truth can often be, many students are genuinely shocked by the
extent to which unwritten rules and local customs-including relation-
ships, power dynamics and shared understandings between certain partici-
pants in the legal process-play a role in American judicial systems. This
20001 467
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is particularly the case if the students have not been adequately prepared
in advance for the reality of law in action. II
The first task an attorney must confront is to figure out what hap-
pened. At some point, the attorney is going to need to present the facts as
well. This may be a highly complex process, combining detective work
with discovery. The fact that what really happened ceases to matter once
an opinion becomes final, however, encourages the view that the facts are
unimportant before the opinion becomes final as well.12 This view threat-
ens the quality of representation and also embodies risks for attorneys in
legislative or administrative roles who are charged with developing policies
and statutes that respond to various needs and crises.
There is not a lot one can do to research the facts contained in an
opinion, both because the protagonists are often so unimportant, and also
because the facts no longer matter once the case is final and thus will go
unpreserved. But one can encourage students at least to think about, if
not to challenge, the material they are given. One way to accomplish this
is to establish clinical, client interviewing, and advocacy programs in which
students will learn the importance of facts to representation. Another way
is to inject an element of history into the law school curriculum. Introduc-
ing students to Richard III will persuade students to think about the facts,
both as recited and as they might have been. The facts are important as
bases for legal opinions, but also as facts, the products of intense research,
interviewing, discovery and questioning.
Our legal system is based upon the premise that the adversarial pro-
cess uncovers the facts. The theory of the adversary system is that if two
(or more) opposing parties engage in legal battle, eventually the truth will
come out. There is little evidence beyond intuition to support the validity
of this premise. 13 But in a way, the legal system is designed to make asking
certain types of questions completely irrelevant. One such type of ques-
tion is epitomized by the query: What really happened? Because the an-
swer does not matter, once the case is over, no one asks. Because no one
asks, the vitality of the adversary system goes unquestioned.
To re-instill a sense of the importance of facts, or at least to make sure
that their importance is not completely forgotten, one must turn to his-
tory. Historians question facts. Lawyers, once a case is over, don't. His-
torians may or may not uncover the "true" facts. We cannot know. But at
least they ask. They check perspectives, comparing different versions.
They don't accept anything at face value. They ask why. They look at
I. See Andrea M. Seielstad, Unwritten Laws and Customs, Local Legal Cultures,
and Clinical Legal Education, 6 CLINICAL L. REv. 127, 129 (1999).
12. See FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO You LAwYERs! 157-79 (1939).
13. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 34-43 (1984); ANNE
STRICT, INJUsTIcF FOR ALL 13-21 (1977); Jamil N. Alibhai et al., Zealous Advocacy
and the Search for Truth, 61 TEX. B.J. 1009, 1010-12 (1998).
[Vol. 45: p. 463
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motivation and its ability to help uncover the actual course of events. 14
They look at people.
Because appellate decisions are tied up so neatly, law students rarely
think about the impact on real people that a case might have had. This
focus away from real-life facts creates the risk that the study of law will be
dehumanized. This risk is particularly decried by those who teach simula-
tion courses like trial practice, by clinicians and by scholars of story-
telling-feminist law and critical race theory.
Not only do cases have an impact on the protagonists. They also af-
fect different groups differently. Law school curriculum tends to lack a
discussion of differences because our legal system makes the questioning
of differences irrelevant. Much of feminist legal methodology considers
the issue of differences. 15 Because so many factors-race, gender, class,
disabilities, etc.-make experiences different, it makes sense to consider
how outcomes affect people differently. The protection of human dignity
requires a willingness to acknowledge different personal and group exper-
iences, perspectives and values.' 6 Legal decisions, in other words, have
consequences for the people affected by them, both as individuals and as
members of various groups. These consequences, especially when they are
negative or painful, require justification. 17
Different voice theory, also referred to as connection theory or cul-
tural feminism, views women's differences as potentially valuable resources
that might serve as a better model of social organization and law than
existing "male" characteristics and values.1 8 Another method useful to
convey different experiences is storytelling. 19 In storytelling, the emphasis
is on the connection between stories and emotion, something the law does
not recognize. The point of these stories, in many instances, is to demon-
strate the gap between the reality of the described experiences, on one
side, and existing legal doctrine, on the other. 20 Ideally, exposing this gap
points the way to change: reformed and transformed law will better reflect
the reality of the experiences of those subject to it.21 The point of "what
14. One of the prime bases for the conclusion that Richard III did not mur-
der the Princes in the Tower is that he had no reason whatever to do so.
15. See Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, Establishing Differences: The Future
of Feminist Legal Scholarship, in GENDER AND AMERICAN LAw: THE IMPACT OF THE LAw
ON THE LIvES OF WOMEN 53, 62 n.29 (Karen J. Maschke ed., 1997).
16. See Frank M. McClellan, Is Managed Care Good for What Ails You? Rumina-
tions on Race, Age and Class, 44 VILL. L. REv. 227, 234 (1999).
17. SeeJane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. 141,
185 (1997).
18. See generally Katherine T. Bartlett, Perspectives in Feminist Jurisprudence, in
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, WOMEN AND THE LAw: CRITICAL ESSAYS, RESEARCH
AGENDA, AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 13 (Betty Taylor et al. eds., 1999).
19. For an exposition of storytelling, see Baron & Epstein, supra note 17, at
142.
20. SeeJane B. Baron, Resistence to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. Rv. 255, 282 n.176
(1994).
21. See id. at 282 n.177.
20001
7
Wertheimer: Shakespeare in Law: The Use of History in Shattering Student Cred
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
really happened" and "many realities" stories is to improve law's informa-
tion base. Reformed or transformed law can never rest on a complete
picture of reality, but it can acquire a fuller, more accurate vision by ac-
cumulating stories that widen the horizon.22
Storytelling may help with this process. 23 Legal storytelling provides a
framework for study of the negative impact of the law on certain non-
majority groups.2 4 The idea behind storytelling is that most people associ-
ate with those who are similar to themselves and are therefore unfamiliar
with the experiences of members of other groups. Thus, the needs of
minority groups are overlooked. Storytelling could alert the majority to
the needs of the minority.2 5 Perhaps the best way to overcome the bias is
the simplest: for "legislators and courts . . . (to) consider race, age, and
other socioeconomic factors when evaluating the reasonableness and de-
sirability of practices and policies." 26
Policymakers, who are often lawyers, may fail to see past the issue at
hand. This shortsightedness is especially common when those whom the
decision will affect most are racial minorities.2 7 There are several areas of
law where the impact affects racial minorities disparately. One example is
in the area of managed care law. The current trend of healthcare is to-
ward HMOs or managed care, but there is little research to provide data
on the effectiveness of managed care in dealing with special populations,
especially the poorer populations such as minorities and the elderly.28
Cost is a factor in switching to a managed care provider, and therefore any
changes in managed care law or in any type of health care reform cur-
tailing access to care are more likely to affect those who cannot pay for the
treatment their HMO denies them. A greater understanding of the im-
22. See id. at 284 n.185.
23. SeeJane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DuKE LJ. 630, 678
(1992).
24. Storytelling has its detractors as well as its advocates. For a dissection of
these detractors and their objections to storytelling, see Baron, supra note 20, at
255. One of the bases for objecting to storytelling is that it bears little resemblance
to conventional legal scholarship. See id. at 256-57. This objection, of course,
misses the point of the concern that motivated this article: the concern that law
school, with its focus on appellate opinions, trains attorneys who are unaware that
their jobs may-and probably will-center on facts.
25. See id. at 282-85 (arguing that storytelling fails because bias against racial
minorities is much more serious than simple ignorance).
26. McClellan, supra note 16, at 235.
27. See Benjamin A. Doherty, Creative Advocacy in Defense of Affirmative Action:
A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposition 209, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 91, 97-99
(1999) (noting that decision to adopt Proposition 209, which prohibits preferen-
tial treatment based on race, gender, ethnicity or national origin, was made by
majority, although it was evident that impact of Proposition 209 would only be
shouldered by discrete, insular minority).
28. See McClellan, supra note 16, at 233 (noting studies have shown that many
people leave their managed care providers, but these studies do not discuss
whether race, ethnicity, culture or class affect whether individuals are more likely
to leave managed care providers).
[Vol. 45: p. 463
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pact upon such groups might contribute to more humane policymaking.
Another area of law where there is a disparate impact on minorities is the
area of tort law. 29 Unless one studies this impact, one cannot help in its
eradication.
C. Can Facts Matter?
The adversary system is based on the premise that the truth is likely to
emerge from presentations by each of the interested parties to the disin-
terested fact finder. After this presentation, the fact finder decides what
really happened. Little except intuition, and perhaps a sense that there
are no better alternatives, supports this system.30
Law students spend much of their time reading appellate opinions
and analyzing the law these opinions expound. We teach them that the
"real" facts do not matter, but rather the facts as set forth by the court,
because those are the facts upon which the opinion rests. Could the scales
really have fallen on Mrs. PalsgraP 3 1 More importantly (for Mrs. Pal-
sgraf), how did she manage after the court threw out her case? Casebooks
often contain edited versions of the "real" events of that stirring occa-
sion. 32 These versions are of course fun to read, but they have no impact
upon the opinion. In other words, even if the facts as set forth by the
court are completely inaccurate, the court's opinion cannot be affected.33
Nor should there be an impact upon the opinion; finality is an end in
itself. But it is not the only end.
29. See Frank M. McClellan, The Dark Side of Tort Reform: Searching for Racial
Justice, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 761, 772 (1996) (noting "that the race problem impacts
on every aspect of a tort claim, adversely affecting lawyers, clients, and the public
conception ofjustice"). Moreover, the approach of pretending that race has noth-
ing to do with tort law compounds the evil by allowing private bias to control.
30. Indeed, other countries, such as France, do not use the adversary system,
at least in criminal cases. See Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of
Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE
L.J. 240, 266 (1977).
31. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
32. See, e.g., MARc A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNA-
TIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 366 (1996); FRANKJ. VANDALL & ELLEN WERTHEIMER,
TORTS: CASES AND PROBLEMS 300 (1997); JOHN W. WADE ET. AL., PROSSER, WADE
AND ScHwARTz'S TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 304 (1994).
33. See, e.g., Taylor v.Johnston, 539 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1975). Taylor involved the
breeding and racing of thoroughbred horses. See id. at 427. The court carefully
analyzed whether there was an anticipatory breach of contract by the defendant or
whether the plaintiff had made performance by the defendant impossible. See id.
at 430-32. For anyone with any knowledge of the thoroughbred racing industry,
the analysis by the appellate court, which reversed the court below, makes no sense
whatsoever. It only requires knowledge of two facts-that all thoroughbreds are
treated for racing purposes as having been born on January 1 and that all thor-
oughbred brood mares are bred every year-to render the opinion completely
baffling. This does not, of course, help the plaintiff, but it shows what can happen
when the parties have inadequately educated the judges.
2000]
9
Wertheimer: Shakespeare in Law: The Use of History in Shattering Student Cred
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
One reason why factual inaccuracy (or even impossibility) cannot be
corrected after the opinion has become final is simply that the opinion has
to be final at some point.3 4 This means that the facts not contained in the
opinion are not verifiable because they are not in the opinion (as though
their inclusion would constitute verification). The only true version is the
one to emerge from the adversary process, not the version reported else-
where. Thus, unlike the court's version, anything else is a matter of specu-
lation. Clearly, law professors (myself included) prefer inaccuracy to
speculation. Philosophically, speculation can be useful, but it has no legal
effect.
The second reason why facts outside those stated in the opinion can-
not matter is that the court bases its legal analysis and conclusions on the
facts as set forth by the court, and not on what might or might not have
"really" happened. Thus, in analyzing the court's opinion, what is impor-
tant about the facts is not what actually happened, a determination that
may or may not have emerged from the adversary process, but rather what
the court chose to recount as the facts. The accuracy of the facts has no
place in an opinion's role as precedent.35
This leads to the third reason. The adversary process is based on the
assumption that the truth will emerge from the highly regulated conflict-
cum-dance presented to the trial judge or jury. In our legal system, no
one really cares what actually happened.3 6 What matters is what one can
prove (or disprove). As a person fascinated by history, this approach,
which I, as an attorney, follow, seems to me to be completely out of touch
with reality, or rather in touch with a reality defined in terms that the
historian would find completely baffling. The adversary system bears a
strong resemblance to the approach to war taken by medieval monarchs. 37
34. There are, of course, exceptions, but for the most part these lie in the
area of criminal law. Even there, the United States Supreme Court has elevated
finality above innocence, at least in some cases. For example, the Court ruled, in a
6-3 decision, that a state death row inmate who presents belated evidence of inno-
cence is not usually entitled to a new hearing in a federal court before execution.
See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Linda Greenhouse, Court Dis-
courages Late Claims of Innocence From Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1993, at Al. In
another case, a man was convicted of shooting an officer in 1981, but new evidence
discovered in 1991 substantially discredited the verdict. One commentator
pointed out that "at this stage, the high court is not interested in guilt or inno-
cence, just procedural questions on whether defendant received all of his constitu-
tional rights." Tim Chavez, First Man to be Executed in 40 Years in the State of Tennessee
May Well be Innocent of a Capital Crime, NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN, Oct. 4, 1999, at Al
(discussing case of Philip Workman); see also Workman v. Tennessee, 510 U.S. 1171
(1994).
35. The Supreme Court of the United States carries finality to its ultimate
point in its "two-court rule." If two courts below have agreed on the facts, the
Supreme Court will accept them as correct. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE 158-61, 189-91 (7th ed. 1993).
36. Except the actual protagonists, of course.
.37. See generally MICHAEL PRESTWICH, ARMIES AND WARFARE IN THE MIDDLE
AGES: THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE (1996).
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If God was on your side, you won."8 The fact that God tended to favor the
side with the larger army, the better tacticians and the stronger supply
lines, was completely coincidental.3 9
This is not to say that the facts are unimportant. At least before a
decision becomes final, and as in medieval warfare, the facts-of terrain,
supply, dexterity-are extremely important. Indeed, one risk of the law
school approach is that students will fail to realize just how important facts
are before a decision becomes final.40 Facts are particularly important in
the common law areas like torts and contracts. The adversary process may
or may not end with a correct version of the facts, however, and it is that
final version of the facts that goes down in posterity as the "correct" one.
Conversely, there are times when the facts are not important, as the
Supreme Court of the United States shows when it refuses to hear cases
that have been decided incorrectly because they do not involve legal issues
sufficient to trigger the Court's waning interest in hearing cases. 41 The
Supreme Court may also dehumanize the facts before it in the interest of
legal theory.42 There are also times when the facts are manifestly improb-
38. See HANS EBERHAND MAYER, THE CRUSADES 8-37 (John Gillingham trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press, 1972) (1965).
39. Occasionally, a battle would be won by what was apparently the less well-
equipped side. The Battle of Agincourt, fought in France on October 25, 1415,
between an English army under Henry V and a French army under Charles
D'Albret, is an example of a conflict in which God apparently sided with the Eng-
lish. Henry's army of 6000 was on route back to England via Calais when they were
confronted by the French army of 25,000. At that point, Henry sought a truce with
France. The truce was rejected. Perhaps to everyone's surprise, the English won a
resounding victory in a heavy rainstorm. Subsequent analysis demonstrated the
superiority of mobile troops over heavily armored cavalry, which became com-
pletely mired in the mud. See generally CHRIS ROTH & CHRISTOPHER ROTHERO, THE
ARMIES OF AGINCOURT (1998).
40. See, e.g., Steven Keeva, Profiting from Experience, 85 A.B.A.J. 56 (1999);
Nancy M. Maurer & Linda Fitts Mischler, Introduction to Laweyering: Teaching First-
Year Students to Think Like Professionals, 44J. LEGAL EDUC. 96 (1994).
41. During the 1998-99 term, the Supreme Court heard 75 cases, half the
number of cases decided in the mid-1980s. In 1999, the Court's closing date was
June 23, 1999, the earliest in 30 years. See Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Supreme
Court;Justices Decide Who's in Charge, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1999, § 4, at 1. An exam-
ple of a case with terrible facts but insufficient to raise the Supreme Court's ire is
Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981). In
that case, students were subjected to searches when drug-sniffing dogs were
brought into school. See id. at 91-92. A dog "alerted" on the plaintiff, and she was
strip-searched, examined, patted down and generally humiliated, but no drugs
were found. See id. As it later turned out, the plaintiff's own dog was in heat, and
the police dog was responding to this fact. See id. at 95 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting).
We know the facts here solely because a lone Justice Brennan dissented from de-
nial of the petition for certiorari and argued to reverse the Court of Appeals on
the basis that the Fourth Amendment does not authorize local school and police
officials to detain students in the public schools and conduct warrantless drug
searches. See Doe, 451 U.S. at 1022 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 420-36 (1980) (Blackmun,J.,
dissenting). Defendants were convicted of the crime of escape, and the Court of
Appeals reversed. See U.S. v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
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able, as in Mrs. Palsgraf's case. In any event, once the case has been de-
cided by the fact finder, the facts completely lose their importance in favor
of what the fact finder decrees "really" happened. This is justifiable
largely because there may be no way to determine what really happened.
Court decisions cannot remain in limbo; they must become final at some
point. So the facts of what happened are relegated to the realm of the
unknowable and undiscoverable for the very good reason that it is impossi-
ble ever to reconstruct them with any assurance of accuracy. This is, per-
haps, the real justification for the adversary system.
It is not this aspect of the legal system that merits challenge from the
historian. Rather, it is the position taken by the legal system that the ad-
versary system can reconstruct what really happened, and that facts can
ever become truly final, that historians would find troubling. In history,
what really happened matters, at least in theory. It may not be possible to
figure out what happened, but a reliable historian should refuse to pre-
tend knowledge where that knowledge is unobtainable. Every appellate
opinion recounts history, in the form of the statement of the facts. To
evaluate this historical piece, students should look at opinions through the
lens that the study of history provides.
There are of course more conventional ways to acquaint law students
with an awareness of the importance of both facts and the need for skepti-
cism about them. One such method is through clinical education. Ex-
ternships and clinics provide a contextual basis for the learner.43 Clinical
legal education attempts to find ways to help law students exercise better
judgment in order to create better future lawyers and to encourage stu-
dents to be responsible and thoughtful practitioners. 44 Much of the peda-
gogical goal of and philosophy behind clinical education-i.e. clinics that
train advocacy and counseling-is to teach students judgment. Thisjudg-
ment also covers learning to deal with the emotional content of cases,
both the clients' and their own. The general sentiment is that judgment is
not something implicitly taught in law school, nor is it easily learned by
students. Problems abound when lack ofjudgment makes people blind to
Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the appellate court and held that es-
capees were not entitled to the claim of defense or necessity unless they demon-
strated that they had no alternative to violation of the escape statute. See Bailey, 444
U.S. at 410-11. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun (joined by Justice Brennan) fa-
mously decried the conditions of prisons and criticized the Supreme Court for its
lack of human perception. See id. at 420 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Black-
mun believed the Supreme Court's decision was inappropriate; he felt the issue of
escape was better suited for a jury to decide in light of all of the evidence. See id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He also felt the decision was intellectually dishonest
given the abominable state of American prisons. See id. at 421 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
43. See Harriet N. Katz, Pedagogy: Using Faculty Tutorials to Foster Externship Stu-
dents' Critical Reflection, 5 CLINICAL L. REv. 437, 443 (1999).
44. See Mark Neal Aaronson, Papers Presented at the UCLA/IALS Conference on
"Conceptual Paradigms in Clinical Legal Education ": We Ask You to Consider: Learning
About Practical Judgment in Lauyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 248-49 (1998).
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others' perspectives. 45 Simulation courses can serve a similar role. Good
business lawyers never stop at the point where they have spotted the prob-
lem-they go on to solve it. Lawyer-negotiators do not allow a seeming
impasse to sabotage an otherwise viable deal; rather, they devise a
favorable compromise, which fulfills the basic needs of both sides without
subjecting either to serious adverse consequences. 4 6
As mentioned above, however, history can also function as a tool for
analyzing the factual piece of appellate opinions. It is to this technique
that this essay now turns.
II. FACTS, HISTORY & SHAKESPEARE IN LAw
Turning to the historian, a different view of the importance of facts
emerges. Facts are vital to the historian. The historian may be as unable
to ascertain the truth as the attorney. That has never stopped an historian
from trying, whether by primary research or by dissecting already existing
materials.
One of the most important truths a historian faces is that of bias. His-
torical truth is itself subject to corruption. 4 7 This corruption takes two
forms. One is that the sources the historian studies are themselves certain
to be biased, at least as biased as the parties in a legal case. The other is
the bias of the historian. In the adversary system, the parties are them-
selves biased, and their attorneys are obligated to be. The judge and jury
are supposed to be disinterested. But the judge and jury bring their own
minds and experiences to the process. This is also the case for the histo-
rian, whose worldview inevitably colors his or her perceptions of reality. It
may be the case that the adversarial system, which at least subjects the final
version of the facts to the test of opposition, is more reliable. There is no
way to know, because there is no way to find out what really happened. It
is all a matter of theory and intuition, that the declaration of what really
happened is more likely to be accurate in one discipline than in another.
The adversarial approach, as well as the law school approach to facts,
create several risks to the intellectual integrity of a legal education. One
risk is the enhancement of the already excessive credulity law students ex-
hibit. Law students need to learn the fictional aspects of the system they
are being taught, as well as how to operate within that system. One way to
accomplish this end may be to use history to provide case studies of how
difficult it is to find out what really happened and how important the eyes
through which we perceive events truly are. One case study, exemplary
both in content and in ready access to material, is the case of Richard III
45. See id. at 249.
46. See James C. Freund, Teaching Problem Solving, 8 AUG Bus. L. TODAY 32
(1999).
47. These forms of corruption are in addition to the self-evident problems
presented by the obvious facts that history is in the past and that there is a paucity
of eyewitnesses to events in the fourteenth century (even if eyewitness testimony
were reliable, which it is not).
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and the Princes in the Tower. A crime was (probably) committed. The
process of examining who might have committed it can teach students a
great deal about the pitfalls of credulity. This process can also teach stu-
dents about the emotional content of recollection and its impact upon
that recollection.
An additional risk of the law school approach to appellate case law is
that it can allow students to forget that there are at least two sides to each
question. In their credulity, students attribute a level of authority to courts
that only a deity should receive. The case of Richard III-to say nothing
of Mrs. Palsgraf-encourages the questioning of sources, one a Catholic
saint, the other an opinion by ajudge accorded almost equal reverence in
the legal world. Facts look neat and well-organized in an appellate opin-
ion (at least compared to reality), and it is helpful to provide a vehicle that
requires students to recognize that this neatness is itself an illusion.
Little has been written about the facts of the Palsgraf case, although
fathomless quantities of ink have been spilled on the law.48 This is in itself
interesting, as further proof that the facts cease to matter as soon as the
opinion is issued. The law, analysis and theory in the opinion, and the
precedent it sets, have nothing to do with what really happened. But to
the historian, what really happened is the most important aspect of the
analysis of sources. Law has to be unique-the only field in which what
really transpired ceases to matter as soon as the opinion is final.
The importance of the facts emerges from the undergrowth of the
forgotten and ignored in the course of teaching by hypotheticals. Law
teaching is based upon hypotheticals, and so is its practice. Hypotheticals
are a teaching device that is all too familiar to students. What would the
court have said, if the facts had been changed in this regard or that? This
teaching device moves into the real world in the form of the requirement
that attorneys persuade courts that the facts in their cases are sufficiently
similar to the facts in an already decided case to warrant applying the same
rule, or evolving an old rule just a little to fit the new case. Maybe facts are
not unimportant after all.
It is perhaps worth noting that one of the strongest arguments against
the death penalty lies with those who contend that the risk of executing an
innocent person outweighs the need for capital punishment. 49 This argu-
ment shows the powerful effect of imagination in the form of an ultimate
48. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Loss Shifting and Quasi-Negligence a New
Interpretation of the Palsgraf Case, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (1941); Arthur L. Goodhard,
The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, 39 YALE L.J. 449 (1930); Leon
Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 789 (1930); William Prosser, Palsgraf
Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1953);John H. Weidner, Negligence: Liability for Conse-
quences of Negligent Acts to Those Outside the Zone of Foreseeable Danger, 14 CORNELL
L.Q. 94 (1930). But seeJOHN T. NOONANJR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw 111-
51 (1976).
49. See MICHAEL L. RADELET, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVIC-
TIONS IN CAPITAL CASES 15-19 (1992); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 22-23 (1987).
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"what if," but also shows that what really happened retains some vitality,
even after a case has become final. It is the impact of imagination on
analysis that leads us back into history, where the imagination of the au-
thor and of the historian meet.
And now we wander into the subject of Richard III. Perhaps because
he was never tried, his case exerts a potent effect on those who read about
it, particularly lawyers. 50 It is clear that history and law meet each time
Richard is retried for the murders of the Princes. 51 It is also clear that
facts-or the endeavor to uncover them-retain their fascination for the
legal profession. We can never know what really happened, in the numer-
ous mysteries that receive attention from the past. But we can seek to
reason our way to what really might have happened, a game that never
loses its vitality.
This leads to the idea of a course on Richard III and other historical
mysteries as an exercise in teaching the intractable difficulty of ascertain-
ing the facts. 52 As an exercise in hypotheticals, trying to uncover and put
50. Much of the recent literature about Richard III has been authored by
attorneys. See, e.g., BERTRAM FIELDS, ROYAL BLOOD: RICHARD III AND THE MYSTERY
OF THE PRINCES (1998); SHARON KAY PENMAN, THE SUNNE IN SPLENDOUR (1990).
Bertram Fields and Sharon Kay Penman are both attorneys. It is worth noting that
Sir Thomas More was a lawyer as well.
51. SeeJeanne Trahan Faubell, Not Guilty-Again!: Three Justices of U.S. Supreme
Court Find Richard III Not Guilty Following Mock Trial Oral Argument Held at the U.S.
Supreme Court, (visitedJuly 14, 1999) <http://www.r3.org/trial/trial2.html>; A King
Gets A Fair Trial, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Nov. 12, 1996, at A10.
Richard III and the murder of the princes has sparked controversy for 400
years. See generally SAMUEL DANIEL, THE CVILE WARS BETWEENE THE HowsEs OF
LANCASTER AND YORKE (London, H.Lownes for S. Waterson, 1609); RAPHAEL
HOLINSHED, CHRONICLES OF ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, AND IRuELAND (London 1807-
1808). For an excellent bibliography of primary and secondary sources, see
<http://www.r3.org/biblio.html>. In the 1950s, Josephine Tey's, The Daughter of
Time (1951), unleashed a new fury of debate over Richard's guilt when she con-
cluded Richard III was innocent. But see ALISON WEIR, THE PRINCES IN THE TOWER
(1995) (arguing as adamantly about Richard's guilt as Tey does of his innocence).
52. There are other historical mysteries suitable for such a course. One such
is the murder of Lord Darnley. See CAROLINE BINGHAM, DARNLEY: A LIFE OF HENRY
STUART, LORD DARNLEY CONSORT OF MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS 178, 180-88, 192, 195-
96 (1995); ANN DUKTHAS, A TIME FOR THE DEATH OF A KING 1-18 (1994); ANTONIA
FRASER, MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS 289, 303-08, 343 (1969). Mary married her cousin,
Lord Darnley, in 1565, without the consent of Queen Elizabeth, another cousin.
In Mary's mind, this solidified her claim to the throne, because she and Darnley
were both grandchildren of Henry VII. Lord Darnley's mother was the Countess
of Lennox, the daughter of Margaret Tudor by her second husband, and grand-
daughter of Henry VII. Mary was descended from Margaret Tudor by her first
marriage, but she was "foreign born," having being born in Scotland. Lord Dar-
nley was arrogant, drunk and generally despicable. Although his murder remains
a mystery, it has not generated as much interest as the deaths of the Princes in the
Tower because he was so disliked and because his only importance was dynastic.
Amy Robsart's mysterious death has sparked several different theories. Rob-
sart was the wife of Robert Dudley, Queen Elizabeth I's close confidante and, many
believed, intended husband. Constant rumors circulated in court that Robert in-
tended to poison his wife so he could marry Elizabeth. Amy Robsart was found
15
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together a coherent version of events out of the past is unsurpassed as an
exercise in factual analysis. There are more than two sides to the question
of who killed the Princes in the Tower. The facts can never be known, nor
can they be finally resolved. Their study is rather a study in the art of
biased reporting. Indeed, one of the most biased versions of the life of
Richard III is also one of the most famous of all purportedly historical
writings: the version promulgated by William Shakespeare. Richard III
can provide students with the opportunity to exercise their common
sense, which tends to atrophy with excessive acceptance of authority, by
providing a forum for teaching about the evaluation of sources, all of
which claim to be factual, but all of which are also mutually inconsistent.
The question of whether Richard III was responsible for the deaths
of the Princes in the tower can thus help illuminate the lawyer's task
in weeding out the truth from fiction, perception from reality. Addi-
tional advantages to using Richard III as a case study include:
ready access to materials, 53 representation of numerous conflicting
viewpoints through five hundred years of history, 54 a high level of cur-
rent interest and modern writings55 and general entertainment val-
dead at the foot of her stairs in 1560. The coroner's report ruled her death acci-
dental, although speculations continue as to the real circumstance of her death.
Her death made marriage between Queen Elizabeth and Dudley impossible. See,
e.g., FIONA BUCKLEY, To SHIELD THE QUEEN 65-124 (1997);J.E. NEALE, QUEEN ELIZ-
ABETH I 78-84, 100, 147 (1992).
The identity of Christopher Marlowe's murderer is known, but why he was
murdered remains a mystery. Theories abound, among them accident or self de-
fense, although some have concluded he died of political necessity. See, e.g.,
CHARLES NICHOLL, THE RECKONING: THE MURDER OF CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE 17-21,
59, 72-73, 328-29 (1992).
53. The Richard III website, http://www.r3.org, is an excellent resource. It is
easy to access and free, and it includes links to numerous other websites as well as
full text versions of all original sources.
54. People started producing materials about Richard III shortly after Bos-
worth in 1485; his plight grasped the imagination from the start . See, e.g.,
ANTHONY CHEETHAM, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF RICHARD III (1972); SAMUEL DANIEL,
THE FIRST FouRE BooKEs OF THE CMLE WARS BETWEEN THE 2 HOUSES OF LANCAS-
TER AND YORKE (1595); EDWARD HALL, THE UNION OF THE 2 NOBLE AND ILLUSTRE
FAMELIES OF LANCASTRE AND YOmE (1548); PAUL MURRAY KENDALL, THE YORKIST
AGE (1962); T. LITTLETON & R. REA, To PROVE A VILLAIN (1964);JOHN STOW, THE
ANNALS OF ENGLAND (1605).
55. Richard III has provoked much interest in our era as well. Modem writ-
ings break down into history and fiction. See, e.g., ANTHONY CHEETHAM, RICHARD
III: LIFE AND TIME (1998);JONATHAN R.T. HUGHES &JEREMY CATTO, THE RELIGIOUS
LIFE OF RICHARD III: PIETY AND PRAYER IN THE NORTH OF ENGLAND (1998) (self-
explanatory); PAUL MURRAY KENDALL, RICHARD III: THE GREAT DEBATE (1992) (in-
cluding Sir Thomas More's biography and its refutation by Horace Walpole); V.B.
LAMB & P.W. HAMMOND, THE BETRAYAL OF RICHARD III (1997) (studying percep-
tions of Richard III from 1485 to today); PENMAN, supra note 51 (historical fiction
sympathetic to Richard III); ELIZABETH PETERS, THE MURDERS OF RICHARD III
(1991) (interesting detective story, more peripherally related to Richard III him-
self); A.J. POLLARD, RICHARD III AND THE PRINCES IN THE TOWER (1991); CHARLES
Ross, RICHARD III (1984) (biography); ANNE F. SUTTON & LIVIA VISSER-FuCHS, THE
HOURS OF RICHARD III (1997) (examining Richard III's religious views); TEY, supra
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ue. 56 If a student has not learned skepticism about facts after exposure to
the Richard III controversy, perhaps he or she should stay away from
litigation. 57
III. DECISIONMAKING &R E LIFE
Before a case appears in appellate form, the lawyer must deal with the
facts. The facts are not always (and maybe not ever) clear from the outset.
Even though one is entitled to believe one's client, an attorney who fails to
uncover the alternative versions that will appear in court may not be doing
his or her job. The client, as a participant in the events at issue, is auto-
matically biased in recounting the relevant events. Of course, some clients
lie, and an attorney needs to be aware of this risk. More often, however,
the client is not lying, but is rather seeing the facts at issue through the
glasses of that client's particular viewpoint. There may, in fact, be at least
two sides to each question, each side truthfully recounted (in the sense of
an absence of conscious lies), and both sides completely inconsistent with
each other. Stories may also change. Figuring out one's client's story is
difficult enough. The lawyer, however, also needs to figure out the oppo-
sition: detecting and preparing to confront the point of view of one's op-
ponent is a critical part of case preparation. Many scholars stress that a
good lawyer needs to develop and exercise "situation-sense .... " Practic-
note 4 (intriguing detective story about modem police officer examining murders
of princes). Richard III is frequently "retried" by various judges. Chief Justice
Rehnquist famously acquitted Richard III at one such trial. See Tony Mauro, A
Uniquely Qualified Chief N.Y.L.J., Dec. 21, 1998, at 2; Tony Mauro, The Highs and
Lows of the High Court, THE CONN. LAW TRIB., Jan. 6, 1997, at 14.
56. See, e.g., LOOKING FOR RICHARD (Searchlight Pictures 1996); RcHARD III
(MGM/UA 1995); RICHARD III (Nelson Entertainment 1955). Shouldn't law
school sometimes be fun?
57. Another exercise in perspective appears in the study of the four Gospels
in the New Testament. In their case, what really happened matters, at least to
theologians, and there is a long history of dialectical gyrations dedicated to the
impossible task of making the versions consistent. Scholars have long debated the
differences in the four gospels and why there are even four "official" versions in
existence. Several incongruities appear. For instance, in the case of the cleansing
of the Temple, Matthew 21.12-13, Mark 11.15-17 and Luke 19.45-46 put it at the end
ofJesus' ministry as one of the last straws in his struggle with the Jewish authorities;
John 2.13-17 includes it at the beginning. To set the tone of the trial of Jesus
before the Sanhedrin, Matthew 26.57-68 and Mark 14.53-65 have it taking place at
night, contrary toJewish law, and Luke 22.65-71 has it after daybreak. See, e.g., NEW
CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1967); CHARLES H. TALBERT, WHAT IS A GOSPEL? (1977);
PETER VARDV & MARY MILLS, THE PUZZLE OF THE GOSPELS 21-77 (1995).
The story of Noah and the Ark is another example of different versions of the
same story. God first tells Noah to bring two of every animal to the ark, and in the
next chapter God tells Noah to bring every clean beast by sevens and to bring
beasts that are not clean, by two. See Genesis 6:19-20 and Genesis 7:2-3. These incon-
sistencies are, of course, insoluble, although one would think that some resolution
would be important to anyone who believes in the literal truth of at least parts of
the Bible.
2000]
17
Wertheimer: Shakespeare in Law: The Use of History in Shattering Student Cred
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ing law responsively requires both a grounding in practice and a willing-
ness to be understanding and flexible in dealing with circumstances. 58
The first step in all this is awareness that the various points of view are
there. In law school, students learn about alternative legal arguments;
they only discuss alternative factual viewpoints as hypotheticals that are by
definition not "real." A course centering around Richard III, whose vil-
lainy (if any) depends upon the perspective of the historian, can begin to
teach an appropriate skepticism.
Skepticism is only part of this exercise, however. Appellate opinions,
in their neat packages, are far removed from the passions and turmoil that
may have surrounded the events as they occurred. This has several impli-
cations. Law students inadequately appreciate the difficulties that trial
judges confront in trying to unravel what happened in the context of a
trial. It is a challenge for the attorneys, but they at least are entitled to
believe what their clients have told them. The trial judge and/orjury have
no such entitlement.59
A trial, however, is a model of neatness compared with the general
chaos that can erupt in the legal system, for example when ajudge is asked
for an emergency order. It is easy to portray Judge Skelly Wright's order
in the famous Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College60 case
as officious and intellectually dishonest.6 1 Maybe it was. 62 But it can be
helpful to visualize the scene that confronted Judge Skelly Wright as he
58. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS,
123-26 (1960).
59. Appellate courts sometimes fail to appreciate the difficulties faced by trial
judges. An example of this is the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in Borel v. Fibreboard, 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). In its opinion,
the Fifth Circuit somewhat unsympathetically threw out the system that a wildly
overworked trial judge had put into place for dealing with the intractable problem
presented by the number of asbestos cases being filed and, once filed, delayed.
60. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
61. See id. at 1006-010. This case arose out of an application for permission to
administer blood transfusions to an exsanguinating emergency patient. See id at
1001. "[The patient] was brought to the hospital by her husband for emergency
care, having lost two-thirds of her body's blood supply from a ruptured ulcer." Id.
at 1006. Both she and her husband were Jehovah's Witnesses and therefore re-
jected any blood transfusion. See id. Her death without blood seemed certain, and
the hospital went to court for permission to administer blood. See id. The District
Court denied the application, and the hospital turned to Judge Skelly Wright of
the District of Columbia Circuit. See id. After conferring with the patient's hus-
band, who refused to approve a transfusion, 10 doctors who urged the transfusion,
and the patient, Judge Wright approved an order allowing the hospital to adminis-
ter transfusions. See id. at 1007. Judge Wright somewhat desperately reasoned that
the patient's voluntary presence at the hospital testified to her desire to live, and
that her statement that a transfusion would be "against my will" meant that it
would be all right if someone else ordered the transfusion. Id.
62. The court, sitting en banc, denied a petition for rehearing. See President
& Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (en banc). For
an extensive discussion of the procedural and substantive issues, see the dissenting
opinion of Judge Miller, 331 F.2d at 1011-16.
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arrived at the emergency room: a young woman bleeding to death, a dis-
traught emergency room staff, what looked like complete chaos to the out-
sider, and Judge Skelly Wright, an outsider, being told that if he signed
the order, the patient would live, and if he did not, she would die.
There is, of course, an advantage for the legal system generally in
having appellate opinions written when the passions and chaos are over.
The law should not be set in the heat of an emergency. The emergency,
long over, can provide the appellate court with the opportunity to decree
how such emergencies should be handled in the future. That is clearly
what the court had in mind in In re Estate of Brooks in which the appellate
court wrote a careful after-the-fact opinion applying the First Amendment
in the context of what had been a dire medical emergency in the trial
court.63 But law students need to know that the chaotic piece of the case
once existed. There were lawyers in the Georgetown University Hospital
emergency room, too, arguing different points of view over the person
exsanguinating on the gurney. A law student needs to be prepared to deal
with the chaos of real life. Too many students graduate with a view of the
law as expounded by appellate judges, and they forget that the case had to
arrive in the appellate court first, with all of the inelegance of real life,
before the appellate court could decide it. An exclusive focus on appellate
opinions cannot teach a good conceptual grasp of the advocate's role in
the resolution of disputes. 64 Once the case is at the appellate level, the
facts are neatly packaged, but they did not start out that way. A course on
Richard III will not change the basic legal curriculum, nor is it intended to
do so. It may, however, serve to remind students that the appellate opin-
ions they read began as slices of real life, with all the ambiguity and lack of
clarity that that entails.
IV. CONCLUSION
What do Mrs. Palsgraf and Richard III have in common? Richard III
lived in fifteenth-century England, Mrs. Palsgraf in twentieth-century
America. Scales fell on Mrs. Palsgraf; the Tudors fell upon Richard III.
What they share, however, is fundamental. We know Mrs. Palsgraf
through the eyes of Judge Benjamin Cardozo, who knew the facts of her
case only from having read them in other documents. His rendition of
the facts was either third or fourth (maybe fifth) hand; they came through
Mrs. Palsgraf and other witnesses, through the lawyers, through the lower
court fact finding process, through an intermediate appellate court, and
finally to him. We know Richard III through the eyes of Shakespeare, who
knew the facts about Richard III only from a sequence of non-eyewitness
sources that were themselves shamelessly biased. No one knows what re-
ally happened either to Mrs. Palsgraf or to the Princes in the Tower. This
63. 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. Sup. Ct. 1965).
64. See Jerry P. Black & Richard S. Wirtz, Training Advocates for the Future: The
Clinic as the Capstone, 64 TENN. L. REv. 1011, 1012 (1997).
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is what they share. And this is what they can teach today's law students.
The facts of a case look neat and tidy through appellate eyes. They did
not, however, start out that way. They never do.
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